THE HOBBESIAN PROBLEM AND THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

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The image of states as unitary actors has been particularly unhelpful for policy makers and analysts dealing with the most pressing recent problems on the international stage. Consider the civil wars in central Africa and the former Yugoslavia, the role of refugees in the relationship between the United States and Cuba, the sorting out of the pieces of the former Soviet Empire, and the links between international terrorism and the warlord systems in Somalia and Afghanistan: all these issues point to the dramatic international effects of internal political disunity. These are particularly dramatic cases involving the search for state identity; but in fact, as Thomas Hobbes argued more than three centuries ago, the struggle to create coherent communities is a critical political issue faced by all states.

Thomas Hobbes is a central progenitor of the realist perspective in the study of international relations and is often identified with the treatment of states as analogous to individuals in the state of nature.1 Importantly, however, while the Hobbesian notion of the “war of all against all” is frequently invoked in the study of international relations, Hobbes develops his political realism primarily in the domestic context. The central problem that Hobbes addresses is how a large group of individuals with diverse and competing interests can create a political community that facilitates cooperative behavior and constrains

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the war of all against all. In the international system, Hobbes and many subsequent writers have viewed the creation of such a community as unlikely or impossible. In contrast, international relations theory often begins from the assumption that states have solved the Hobbesian problem of building coherent political communities at the domestic level. This is certainly true for those theories that are built on the unitary rational actor assumption. Even many putative theories of foreign policy emphasize the cohesive rather than the potentially divisive nature of national security questions.

Is the assumption that the Hobbesian problem is solved at the domestic level warranted in the study of international relations? Or do we need to think more carefully about the ability of states to create adequately cohesive internal communities for the purposes of engaging in international relations? These questions are important for both substantive and theoretical reasons. Substantively, these questions are ultimately empirical: how is it, in fact, that states are sustained as cohesive units? Theoretically, these questions are about the necessity of incorporating the decision making of domestic actors into our theories of international relations. Students of international relations are showing increasing interest in exploring the links between domestic and international politics. I want to go further here to argue that the ways in which states constitute themselves and attempt to solve the Hobbesian problem are consequential for international relations theory.

My argument will focus on national security issues. Since national security is the arena in which state unity has been most frequently taken for granted, the implications I draw here will usually apply a fortiori to international economic relations.


3. Hobbes does not actually put too much effort into developing this argument. Kings will engage in wars because, like all people, they lust after ever more power (Leviathan, 11.2). He says that while there has never been a real “state of nature” for individuals, “in all times” sovereigns are in a state of war with each other (Leviathan, 13.12). The international state of war does not lead to the same pressures for amelioration since individuals within states can still lead reasonably secure and industrious lives (Leviathan, 13.12). Bertrand Russell, on the other hand, argues that all of Hobbes’s arguments for Leviathan would apply equally to an overarching international government. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 557. Indeed, Hobbes’s ambiguity on this point has led the English School to reject Hobbes as a progenitor of contemporary realism; see Michael Williams, “Hobbes and International Relations,” International Organization 50, no. 2 (spring 1996): 213–15.

THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY

Confronting the Hobbesian problem forces us to address questions about the microfoundations of international relations theory. Most theoretical work in international relations has utilized aggregations of individuals as the central actors. When we address the microfoundations of such theories, we ask whether the decisions we expect individuals to make within these units are compatible with the behavior theorized at the aggregate level. Do the incentives faced by the individual human beings—state leaders, opposition politicians, soldiers, and everyday citizens—make it possible for states to act as states in the international arena? In particular, do the individuals have incentives to stick together, and are there incentives for individuals to make material sacrifices—to put health and wealth at risk—for the sake of national security?

Hobbes would have no quarrel with the importance of studying the microfoundations of international relations theory. In his adaptation of Galileo’s resolutive-compositive methodology, the behavior of societies is built on the aggregation of the incentives and passions of individuals. More contemporary realists, however, have minimized the importance of this approach. Waltz, for example, argues vigorously against “reductionism,” with the assertion that the consistent character of international behavior despite variance in domestic factors obviates the need for inquiry into the domestic politics of states.

Structural realism has provided the heuristic base for a number of advances in international relations theory. Nonetheless, there are both substantive and methodological reasons to worry about building the microfoundations of our theories. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, for example, argue that the empirical record supports the position that international behavior is better explained by internal political dynamics than by the demands of the international system alone. In general, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in the domestic sources of foreign policy. Similarly, the increasing use of decision-

5. Markus Fischer has pointed to the failure of the neorealists to build a foundation for realism on a set of assumptions about the basic character of human nature. Interestingly, he suggests a return to the political realism of Machiavelli and Hobbes as a source for such a microfoundation. Markus Fischer, “Machiavelli’s Theory of Foreign Politics,” Security Studies 5, no. 2 (winter 1995): 248–79.


theoretic models in the study of international relations suggests a need for understanding how the preferences of decisionmakers aggregate into the interests attributed to states.

Even if we accept the realists’ metaphor of states as opaque billiard balls caroming off each other in their international interactions, understanding the ways in which states solve the Hobbesian problem will be important for our understanding of the long-term dynamics of the international system. I develop this argument in more detail below. For now, suffice it to say that in the realist vision, states can manipulate their position in the distribution of power through either external or internal change. There are few more important changes internally than increasing a society’s cohesion and unity of purpose in foreign policy pursuits. Of course, the benefits of cohesiveness should not be overstated. An excessive or stifling unity may lead to poor decision making or some diminution of international effectiveness. Nonetheless, some relatively high level of cohesion around foreign policy goals is clearly beneficial for the effective articulation and implementation of foreign policy.

At a minimum, the pursuit of microfoundations can be justified methodologically as pure science. Even if we believe that the unitary rational actor assumption is empirically justified or simply necessary for parsimonious theories, we should still desire theories that are as complete as possible. We need to know whether the unitary actor assumption is a convenient fiction or if it is well grounded in the dynamics of foreign policy. More immediately significant, the increasing use of formal theories of analysis suggests an important need for work on microfoundations. As in economics, there is an increasing effort to draw connections between the incentives faced by individuals and the aggregate result of their behaviors. We need to show that behaviors postulated at the aggregate level are consistent with the incentives individuals face.


SOLVING THE HOBBESIAN PROBLEM

There are four broad solutions to the Hobbesian problem. These solutions are not necessarily exclusive, but have reasonably separable characteristics and effects, both within the state and in the international system. The first solution is the creation of an “internal security community” in which citizens join together to protect themselves from each other. The second is an “external security community” in which citizens form a compact to protect themselves from other security communities. The third is an institutionalized community in which social structures create incentives for common action on the part of individuals. The fourth is a normative community in which cohesion is facilitated by shared ideas. These ideas might be a common set of preferences and values, or even just a shared sense of political community and the duties of citizenship.

These solutions can be roughly associated with the major paradigms of international relations theory. The internal and external security communities accord with realist approaches. The institutionalized community fits most closely with the liberal and institutionalist approaches. The normative community is most likely to resonate with a constructivist approach.

Though some part of each of these solutions can be found in *Leviathan*, Hobbes shows a decided preference for the first—the internal security community. Meanwhile, the solution most frequently advanced in the study of international relations has been the second—the external security community. I will argue here that these first two solutions are inadequate both empirically and theoretically. I will instead suggest that to the degree that states succeed in solving the Hobbesian problem, it is most likely to be through the use of unifying institutions and associative norms. These two approaches to state unity provide a more solid foundation both for our theoretical understanding of international relations and for an appropriate empirical description of state behavior.

SOLUTION I: THE INTERNAL SECURITY COMMUNITY

Hobbes’s famous solution to the problem of creating a cohesive state is, of course, *Leviathan*—a state sufficiently powerful to coerce cooperative behavior from the citizenry. To constrain the competing interests of individuals effectively, the state must have absolute power. Without such overwhelming power, the same problems of cooperation and commitment that make the state of nature such an unpleasant place will cause a similar degeneration of society. Individuals will be willing to give up all of their rights—except for the right of
self-preservation—in exchange for the benefits of a political society free of the
dangers of the state of nature. Individuals see those benefits as possible only
insofar as the state is able to enforce the simultaneous renunciation of rights
by all citizens.  

The internal solution falls short as a theoretical foundation for international
relations. The provision of national security will be very difficult if the sover-
eign cannot ask citizens to jeopardize their self-preservation. This problem has
been noted even at the domestic level, where some have asked how police
officers and others would be recruited to do the dangerous work of law en-
forcement. The dangers faced by law enforcement officials in a police state
pale in comparison to the risks soldiers face on the battlefield. Hobbes recog-
nizes this problem, arguing that citizens would have an obligation to risk their
lives if the sovereign requests it for a purpose consistent with the defense of
sovereignty itself:

[T]he obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the
sovereign, to execute any dangerous or dishonourable office, dependeth
not on the words of our submission, but on the intention, which is to be
understood by the end thereof. When, therefore, our refusal to obey
frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained, then there is
no liberty to refuse; otherwise there is.  

And when the defence of the commonwealth requireth at once the
help of all that are able to bear arms, everyone is obliged, because oth-
wise the institution of the commonwealth, which they have not the
purpose or courage to preserve, was in vain.

It is not clear that individual incentives in the Hobbesian state can support
the defense of sovereign power. Except in those rare cases of an all-out de-
fense of the realm, when every single contribution is clearly required, there will
be a free-rider problem in the Hobbesian commonwealth. No one individual’s
contribution will be “required” if there are other individuals who could do
the job. Hobbes also allows exceptions to these duties for those who are

14. Hobbes, 

15. Jean Hampton, 

16. Hobbes, 

17. Hobbes, 

18. See Hampton, 

“naturally timorous” or who find someone else to take their place. This approach opens the door for citizens to decide for themselves on the appropriateness of specific military efforts, and might put significant limits on the ability of the sovereign to use force in the execution of foreign policy.

Hobbes expected sovereigns to recognize the importance of treating their citizens well. Indeed, some of the earliest criticisms of Hobbes focused on what were seen as the excessive rights of citizens in his model state. The religious notion of the divine right of kings allows no opportunity to resist any command of the sovereign. Hobbes’s acceptance of a right to refuse dangerous service led to Bramhall’s famous assertion that, far from being a paean to absolute authority, *Leviathan* actually was a “rebel’s catechism.” While most interpretations of Hobbes have emphasized the strong authority of the Hobbesian state, several recent interpretations have returned to Bramhall’s focus on the responsibilities of rulers. Flathman, for example, labels Hobbes’s philosophy a “chastened” view of the powers of the sovereign.

Nonetheless, Hobbes would not allow that the lack of responsible and constrained sovereignty could be a justification for rebellion. Thus, building the absolutist state on the Hobbesian psychology of self-preservation still raises the obvious theoretical problem of just how oppressive a regime people will accept before they either prefer the state of nature or believe that some other sovereign might be available. Locke, who had a much more benign sense of the state of nature, asks why individuals should accept the awesome powers of the Hobbesian state to escape from the relatively puny powers of other individuals in the state of nature:

> This is to think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by Pole-Cats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions.

Indeed, twice in Hobbes’s lifetime absolutist rulers in England lost their grip on the social contract when sizable minorities decided that they preferred the risks of civil war to the “safety” of the sovereign’s rule. Just nine years after Hobbes’s death, James II was forced off the throne and William of Orange was imported from Holland to replace him in the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

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when a sufficient majority of parliamentarians became concerned that James was too Catholic and overly indifferent to English affairs.

Finally, it is not clear that the foreign policy interests of a society will adequately cohere with the foreign policy interests of an absolute sovereign. Hobbes recognized this problem but touted monarchy as the best form of commonwealth on the grounds that it maximized the coherence of the interests of the sovereign and the public:

for the most part if the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private; for the passions of men are commonly more potent than their reason. From whence it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced.

Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public.²³

The tumultuous foreign policy alignments of seventeenth-century England should have raised questions for Hobbes about the accuracy of this perspective. The institution of the monarchy in the seventeenth century was highly internationalized. The Stuart kings were connected by marriage to ruling families in Denmark, Holland, France, Portugal, and parts of what are now Italy and Germany. One of James I’s most trusted advisers and confidants was the Spanish ambassador to England, Sarmiento de Acuña.²⁴ Charles II was closely aligned with the French court, where he (and Hobbes, who briefly tutored him in math) had lived after the royalist defeat in 1646. The extent of Charles’s French connection was made clear in 1675 when, in exchange for an annual subsidy of £100,000, he signed a treaty with Louis XIV promising to dissolve parliament if it should prove hostile to France.²⁵ He continued to receive the subsidy despite his failure to disband the unruly legislature even when it went so far as to declare war on France. Charles did refuse to act on the declaration of war. The English ambassador to France was then instructed to ask Louis XIV for an annual salary for the English King of six million livres, since Charles could not expect any money from Parliament once he had stood in the way of its expressed desire for war with France.²⁶

The independence of nations in the sense used by the realists assumes that states are rational egoists.²⁷ This is a difficult position to sustain if representa-

tives of the interests of other states permeate national security decision making.  

Even if we overlook the theoretical problems with the internal security community as a basis for state cohesion in international relations, this solution remains empirically unsatisfying. Usually when we think about the state of human liberty we focus on the relative paucity of respect for individual rights in most of the world over most of the course of history. As rare and as recent as the creation of liberal states has been, however, the extremes of the absolutist Hobbesian state also have rarely been achieved. Certainly, many rulers have sought that ideal, but they have rarely met with sustained success. The majority hardly approximate the level of absolutism that Hobbes proposes. Moreover, in those cases in which the ideal of absolutism has been sought, it is unlikely that absolutism emerged as a goal of a security-conscious citizenry. Indeed, even though writing in the “era of absolutism,” Hobbes acknowledges the rarity in practice of sovereignty that approximates his model. He dismisses this empiricism, however, with the assertion that this lack is the explanation for the frequency of disorder in his times:

The greatest objection is that of the practice, when men ask where and when such power has by subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when or where has there been a kingdom long free from sedition and civil war…. For though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be.  

In sum, Hobbes’s assertions are not compelling. It is not at all clear that there is a positive relationship between absolutism and foreign policy cohesiveness. Hobbes identified a very real problem, but historically, his solution has seemed as implausible as it is unpleasant.

Most theorists of international relations, while endorsing the Hobbesian vision of anarchy at the international level, have not incorporated the internal security solution into their theories at the domestic level. There has been the occasional assertion that democracy is incompatible with the effective formation and conduct of foreign policy, and thus that liberal states would not be able to compete with authoritarian states in the international system. By and 

31. Bertrand Russell chides Hobbes for wanting to make states more effective: “So long as there is international anarchy, it is by no means clear that increase in the efficiency in the
large, however, where it has not simply been assumed, state cohesion has usually been attributed to the pressures of the international system itself. This brings us to the second and probably most commonly postulated solution to the Hobbesian problem: the external security community.

SOLUTION II: THE EXTERNAL SECURITY COMMUNITY

While in the internal security community a group of citizens band together to keep themselves safe from each other, international relations theorists have most often assumed that the Hobbesian problem would be solved with an external security community—a group of citizens who band together to keep themselves safe from other states. Hobbes certainly recognized the importance of the common defense as a motivation for forming a commonwealth, but it does not play nearly the central role that internal security does in his system of thought. In the external security view, the war of all against all at the international level ensures the creation of social contracts at the domestic level. Communities are cohesive not so much because the alternative is the state of nature, but because the community itself exists within an anarchic international order that approximates a state of nature. In this argument the dangers of international competition motivate individuals to join together to form natural security communities. Margaret Levi has proposed such pressures as a prime source of state creation:

Individuals will consider joining with others in a state organization only when they face a common enemy or problem; otherwise, they will continue to compete among themselves.32

In sociology this perspective has been captured by the in-group/out-group hypothesis. As formulated by Georg Simmel, communities define themselves

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less by whom they include than by whom they exclude. The cohesion of communities emerges from this process of exclusion and from the perception of external threats. Actors who might otherwise be competing with each other join together in common purpose when faced with a common enemy. The acceptance of the in-group/out-group hypothesis is sufficiently strong that some see it as a general law that external pressure increases the internal coherence of groups. The strongest evidence for this hypothesis in international relations is the “rally effect” whereby support for government leaders increases dramatically in times of crisis.

Despite its frequent invocation, the external security community is little more satisfying as a foundation for international relations theory than the internal security community. Again, this is true on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Hobbes himself raises two objections to the external security community as a basis for state cohesion. First, in an argument somewhat inconsistent with his description of the state of nature and of the ambitions of sovereigns, he argues that there may not always be a common enemy. Second, and more relevant to the thrust of my argument here, he warns that different individuals may view outsiders differently:

> Nor is it enough for security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed and directed by one judgment for a limited time, as in one battle or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy, yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves.

The external security model cannot explain how states form effective barriers to the influence of external interests. At a minimum there will be the kinds of cross-state sectoral alliances that emerge through economic interdependence. For national security issues, it is plausible that unity will emerge if a

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34. Simmel, *Conflict*, chap. 3.
conquering state announces in advance its plans to kill or enslave everyone in the target state. More clever expansionary states, however, will lower the costs of invading their neighbors by making alliances with subgroups in the target state. Events that elicit a coherent sense of national emergency and urgent universal service are, in fact, relatively rare in the international system.

Finally, the externalization of the security problem also brings us no closer to resolving collective action issues. Why should individuals risk their own lives to defend the collective, when individually their marginal contribution to the common defense is not measurable, and when there are others who could do the job just as well? As with the internal security community, the rare case when national survival is threatened and the maximal contribution by each and every individual is clearly demanded might motivate individual choices to sacrifice safety. Even in such conflicts, however, some will serve the state as supply sergeants while others face war in the trenches of the front lines. Apportioning the costs for the indivisible benefit of common defense remains a significant problem.

Empirically, one might consider the experiences of states in the Second World War—surely as significant a national security event as any the international order has experienced in the past two centuries. Despite this major international conflict, there was a wide set of interests within states. There is little to suggest that the mere existence of an external threat was itself sufficient to motivate unity within these countries. Conscription was required in all of the states and there is evidence of significant increases in domestic disunity.39 If states had serious problems solving the Hobbesian problem in that period, it would seem unlikely that the natural national security community can be counted on to motivate significant unity during the more frequent conflicts of lesser peril.

Lewis Coser, who, along with Simmel, played a central role in developing the in-group/out-group hypothesis, warned that external conflict will only increase cohesion for those groups that are already well formed, when there exist beliefs that the preservation of the group is a worthy goal, and when the external conflict clearly threatens the whole of the group and not just parts of it.40 Thus, the in-group/out-group approach begs the question of how the group is established in the first place.

We are left with the same two questions with which we began: First, how do states maximize the probability that political leaders will follow a coherent set

of interests? As should be clear from the case of the Second World War, this probability does not appear to be maximized simply because of a significant external threat. Second, how do states overcome the collective action problem, as required for the use of force both in self-defense and abroad? The answer to both of these questions can be found in the third and fourth solutions to the Hobbesian problem: the institutionalized security community and the normative security community.

SOLUTION III: THE INSTITUTIONALIZED SECURITY COMMUNITY

The most significant difficulty in interpreting Hobbes is reconciling his notion of the necessarily unlimited rights of the sovereign with the frequent duties he ascribes to that office.

The office of the sovereign...consisteth in the end for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely, the procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the law of nature.... Bly safety here is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself.

Hobbes was concerned about effective and just governance, though he was willing to be satisfied with almost any government as superior to the alternative of living in a state of nature. As Hobbes recognized, the key to effective sovereignty is making sure that the sovereign’s private interests overlap with the public interest. He asserts that this is most likely to occur with a single monarch whose private interests are tied up in the glories and riches of his or her country:

The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation of his subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak (through want or dissension) to maintain a war against their enemies.

41. This is not meant as a prescription for enabling or encouraging the use of force abroad. I merely mean that since we observe the frequent use of force in the international system, only solutions to the Hobbesian problem that allow for these frequently observed military adventures will be adequate to serve as a theoretical foundation for the study of the current practices of international relations.

42. Hobbes, Leviathan, 30.1.

43. Ibid., 18.20, 20.18.

44. Ibid., Leviathan, 19.4.
The historical evidence is weak, however, that absolute monarchs, and in particular Hobbes’s preferred form of hereditary monarchs, have always been good either at valuing the riches, strength, and reputation of their subjects, or at recognizing the appropriate policies for maximizing those qualities. Likewise, one does not have to think hard to name examples of absolute or nearly absolute rulers whose sense of the national interest in international affairs did not seem well tuned to the security and prosperity of the domestic public.45

The question, to turn that of Reinhold Niebuhr on its head, is how can we craft an adequately unselfish system of government to identify and pursue the common good from the raw material of selfish and immoral individuals? The answer is: institutions. Historically, the key to coordinating the interests of the public and the interests of sovereign power has been the effective institutionalization of decision making and accountability. The institutionalized community creates a coherent sense of purpose through formal rules and procedures of decision making. In particular, such communities have procedures for selecting policies and for evaluating the performance of leaders. The most transparent form of such institutions are found in the liberal democratic states with their clear-cut electoral procedures and carefully defined offices. Other forms of government, however, have also had clear lines of authority and procedures for selecting and deposing their political leaders.

Hobbes clearly appreciates the importance of decision-making institutions in overcoming the incoherence that will result from competing individual perspectives.46 He is willing to accept that sovereignty might rest in a representative assembly, although he is clearly skeptical about the potential of democratic institutions.47 Hobbes, however, strongly rejects the notion of institutions of accountability. His most fundamental precept for institutional design is that sovereignty must not be limited or divided.48 Indeed, Hobbes’s preference is for a single monarch, and in this framework he offers only a very thin notion of institutions.

This is not to claim that either aggregating diverse individual interests into a coherent set of national interests or monitoring and regulating the actions of leaders is an easy task. All of the difficult problems of social choice and moral hazard must be overcome. Still, as Hobbes himself argues, political regimes should be compared to the likely alternatives rather than to an impossible

45. Stephen D. Krasner, for example, argues that Third World dictators are motivated more by maximizing their freedom of action and their ability to maintain office than by maximizing the wealth and well being of their subjects. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
48. Ibid., chap. 29.
ideal. For Hobbes the alternative to absolute sovereign power is the extraordinary hardship of the state of nature. Contrary to his claims, however, civil war and sedition have not been the norm for most regimes with institutions of both decision making and accountability built on what he calls “the sand” of limited sovereignty.49

In fact, institutionalization has been the key to solving the Hobbesian problem for most states in the past two centuries. Leaders have been held accountable for the performance of their states both domestically and in foreign policy. In the domestic realm, the relationship between economic performance and the electoral fortunes of ruling parties in the Western democracies is well known.50 With increasing economic interdependence, foreign policy performance and economic performance may well become increasingly linked. Leaders are also held accountable for their performance in the national security arena.51 For example, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller, and Siverson and Bueno de Mesquita, have argued that foreign policy performance has a significant effect on the longevity of leaders in office.52

The institutionalized commonwealth can contribute to the creation of a coherent national interest out of a community of diverse interests. It still has difficulty, however, offering an effective solution to the problem of collective action for national security. There can be enforcement institutions that extend accountability to individual soldiers, but as Barry Posen has argued, shirking on the battlefield is a significant problem that has been exacerbated by the technologies of modern war.53 Posen goes on to argue that nationalism is a response to the difficulties of motivating dispersed soldiers on the battlefield. Following his line, it would seem that the most promising approach for addressing this aspect of the Hobbesian problem is to turn to the fourth solution: the normative security community.

SOLUTION IV: THE NORMATIVE SECURITY COMMUNITY

A mechanism for aggregating individual interests into collective goals is not sufficient for solving the collective action problems involved in making

49. Ibid., Leviathan, 20.19.
50. Russett, Controlling the Sword, 26–34.
51. Ibid., 87–118.
53. Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power.”
sacrifices for the public defense. Douglass North expressed the essence of this problem in looking at the microfoundations of economic theory:

The neoclassical model has an asymmetrical dilemma built into its behavioral function because it assumes both wealth maximization and the Hobbesian model of the state, which will constrain behavior to produce a viable political system. If individuals are acting rationally with respect to the first assumption then they are acting irrationally with respect to the second. It is certainly in the interests of a neoclassical actor to agree to constrain behavior by setting up a group of rules to govern individual actions: hence the view that the Hobbesian state is a logical extension of the neoclassical model applied to a theory of the state. But it is also in the interests of the neoclassical actor to disobey those rules whenever an individualistic calculus of benefits and costs dictates such action. That action would, however, result in the non-viability of any state, since enforcement costs of the rules would be, if not infinite, at least so large as to make the system unworkable.  

North argues that norms and values have to be a critical part of institutional analysis. Ideology has to be incorporated into our models of individual economic incentives in order to explain the existence of states that are rational for the community as a whole but that cannot be supported by the simple material incentives faced by individuals. The assumption that security interests will provide the necessary incentives to solve the Hobbesian problem in the arena of national security is as theoretically problematic as the assumption that the free-rider problem can be solved in the economic arena.

The normative solution to the Hobbesian problem is to hold states together with shared values, preferences, or ideas about citizenship and its responsibilities. For the first three solutions—the internal, external, and institutionalized security communities—the interests of individuals are narrowly material. That is, they are defined primarily by the pursuit of individual wealth or survival. In the normative approach, the interests of individuals are conditioned by concerns that can transcend this materialist base.

If we constrain Hobbes to a material definition of interest, then Hobbes’s is a functionalist argument: citizens must be willing to sacrifice security when the

56. A similar problem also underlies the connection between macro-level electoral models based on simple material interests and the motivation for any single individual to vote. There is no material incentive to vote, given the vanishingly small probability that any one individual's vote will materially affect the outcome of the election.
state itself requires protection, because without such a sacrifice the notion of the state is impossible.\textsuperscript{57} Such an approach to this issue deviates from the more deductive nature of the resolutive-compositive method. Indeed, we could simply turn this argument around: the notion of the state is impossible without citizens who are willing to sacrifice their security. The incentives of the individual and the needs of the collectivity cannot be rationalized without allowing for the existence of goals and ideals that individuals hold to be worth the sacrifice of security.

Facing this limitation in the traditional interpretation of Hobbes, several scholars have recently emphasized the importance of the normative solution for Hobbes. Sharon Lloyd argues that the Hobbesian notions of political obligation and social order can only be understood in light of a conception of interests based on ideals that transcend the fear of death.\textsuperscript{58} Applying this strain of thought to international relations, Michael Williams urges international relations theorists to rethink the simple rationalism that has usually colored the interpretation of Hobbes.\textsuperscript{59} He proposes an interpretation of Hobbes that emphasizes the role of knowledge and legitimacy. The Hobbesian project, in his view, is to convince leaders of the importance of limiting their own power and to convince citizens of the benefits of a sense of duty.\textsuperscript{60}

The notion of normative security communities accords with empirical observation. Turning again to the Second World War example, it is clear that all of the major parties expended considerable energy in promoting normative communities and that these efforts were essential to their war efforts. Ideological motivation is a critical element in the combat-effectiveness of soldiers.\textsuperscript{61} The Soviets revitalized the Russian Orthodox Church in order to encourage nationalist support for the war effort. The role of Nazi ideology and enthusiasm was critical to Germany’s war effort. Britain and the United States each had significant internal propaganda machines. It was surely these efforts and the underlying sense of nationalism and ideological purpose, rather than a calculation by each individual that his or her contribution was essential for national survival, that led so many citizens to volunteer to face the dangers of war.

\textsuperscript{59} Williams, “Hobbes and International Relations.”
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 220.
\textsuperscript{61} Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” 84 n. 9.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Understanding the way in which states solve the Hobbesian problem is important in and of itself. It is surely also critical to any attempts to pull together a theory of foreign policy and a theory of international relations. Structural realists, however, will argue that it is not essential for our theories of international relations unless the way states deal with the Hobbesian problem has significant effects on the behavior of states that could not otherwise be accounted for. In fact, I will argue presently that different approaches to the Hobbesian problem do have profound implications for the international system and the behavior of states within it.

THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF INTERNAL COHESION

In the first place, the inability of some states to solve the Hobbesian problem adequately has important effects on the composition of the international system and the kinds of stresses faced by states within it. One need only think here of the role of internal cohesion in some of the most pressing of recent problems faced by the world community. In addition to the continuing aftershocks of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the problems in the Balkans and in central Africa are clearly driven by the dynamics of internal cohesion. In each of these situations, the failure to resolve the Hobbesian problem has had effects that spill over into grave foreign policy problems for their neighbors and for the leading states in the international system.

The potential scope of these spillover problems is suggested by Charles Maynes, who calculates that seventy-nine of the eighty-two violent conflicts going on around the world in the period between 1989 and 1995 can be classified as “internal conflicts.” The phenomenon of a large number of states simultaneously experiencing significant internal disunity may reflect system-wide changes in legitimacy norms. The very existence of modern states can be traced to changes in notions of legitimacy and to institutional innovations in the late Middle Ages. Decolonization was clearly driven by broad changes in ideas about the legitimacy of overseas empires. So too, the sweep of Marxist and democratic revolutions suggest the concrete manifestations of ideas about the appropriate domestic basis for unified communities.

THE HOBBESIAN PROBLEM AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Legitimacy and the power of states. At its root, the Hobbesian problem is a problem in the creation of state legitimacy. To the degree that internal legitimacy is a critical component of external power, the way in which states resolve the Hobbesian problem will clearly matter in international relations. States that are able to unite their citizens effectively in a common purpose will be better able to extract resources for enhancing their international capabilities, and will be able to apply those resources more effectively in their international relations.

There is some important recent work that addresses this point empirically. Hendrik Spruyt argues that the ascendance of sovereign states as the dominant form of social organization in the late Middle Ages is largely a result of their superior ability to create and act on a coherent set of interests—as contrasted to the leagues of cities and city states.64 Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast have pointed to the beneficial effects of democracy on the ability of the state to extract resources from society.65 David Lake, likewise, argues that the legitimacy advantages of democracy help to account for their strong performance in international conflicts, despite the common perception of democracies as weak and vacillating.66 Surveying the Latin American experience, Stanislav Andreski argues that military dictatorships are less capable of projecting force externally because their military resources are tied up in maintaining power domestically.67

Ironically, Hobbes was unenthusiastic about this specific solution. He attributes to democracy only greater problems in state cohesion. In particular, he viewed democracy as too likely to give opportunities to “the children of pride” to pursue their ambitions to power at the expense of the commonwealth.68 He had no appreciation of the potential for democratic institutions to enforce accountability on the part of the sovereign. Indeed, the electoral characteristics of democracy receive no consideration in Leviathan.

Innovation and emulation in legitimization. We generally think of the Hobbesian character of the international system as making life for individuals more

64. Ibid.
dangerous. One way in which it may actually work to their benefit is in forcing a reasonable degree of efficiency on the part of states. There has been a worry that international pressures limit the ability of sovereigns to grant rights to individuals.69 From the other side, however, it should also limit the ability of states to exploit their citizens excessively. Hobbes saw this as true even in his idealized world.70 A fortiori, in the real world in which leaders have some form of accountability, they will not be able to fall too far behind the pace of other states in providing those rights that are necessary to create sufficient legitimacy for survival in the international system. A lack of legitimacy can threaten survival both because of the danger of internal collapse,71 and because it can encourage attacks by other states.72

Modern communications technologies have made it even more imperative for states to keep pace with the economic and military capabilities of other states. Individuals can more easily evaluate the relative performance of their state and other comparable states in economic terms. Thus, for reasons both of external competition and internal survival, states will have incentives to match innovations that other states make that enhance internal cohesion and legitimacy, just as they are forced to match innovations in military or manufacturing technology.

Two examples of such legitimacy innovations might include democratic institutions and nationalism. In the case of the former, we are currently seeing a significant expansion in the number of at least nominally democratic states. Indeed, many states are pursuing the forms of democratic organization—that is, elections—even where the underlying values and institutions do not yet exist to support them. There is a strong perception that at least the appearance of democracy can be beneficial for national strength. In the same way, when nationalism swept the world system at the end of the nineteenth century, few states could hold their place in the distribution of power without drawing on a similar basis for legitimacy.73

69. The surrender of rights is, of course, central to Hobbes. One particular example would be his argument for strict government control over the expression of opinions (Hobbes, Leviathan, 18.6).
70. Ibid., chap. 15.
71. In this regard, Hobbes lists the comparison some citizens made between economic growth in England and that of the Dutch republics as a contributory cause of the English civil war (ibid., 3–4).
Usually, innovations in internal legitimation have propagated through the traditional mechanisms of socialization and selection. On occasion, however, international practices have arisen that encourage or discourage specific approaches to solving the Hobbesian problem. Janice Thomson, for example, chronicles the delegitimation of mercenary armies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{74} This shift had the effect of rewarding states that had effective internal legitimacy for raising their own armies, at the expense of those states that, lacking a sufficiently motivated domestic population, could only purchase their military forces from other states. The delegitimation of the trade in mercenaries increased the power of legitimate and well-institutionalized states and further decreased the power of less legitimate and more poorly institutionalized states.

Just as legitimacy is an important part of a state’s power, delegitimation often serves as a weapon in the arsenal of states. Many of the battles of the cold war involved attempts by the United States and the Soviet Union to undermine the legitimacy of their rivals. The United States sought to establish liberal democracy as the test for legitimacy and to convince Soviet citizens and allies that the lack of such institutions should diminish their willingness to make sacrifices for the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union focused on the illegitimate nature of capitalism and imperialism in an attempt to undermine domestic accord within the United States and its alliance. This legitimacy battle was plausibly critical to the end of the cold war, when liberal notions of legitimacy emerged as victors over class-based notions.

NORMATIVE SECURITY COMMUNITIES AND STATE INTERESTS

Finally, the normative solution to the Hobbesian problem raises a fundamental question for theories of international relations based on the assumption that states are solely concerned with the pursuit of security: If individuals are willing to sacrifice their personal security for nonmaterial goals and ideals, will they also be willing to have the commonwealth make such a sacrifice? Hobbes’s realism is built on shaky ground from the outset to the degree that he makes the desire for security fundamental at the same time that he recognizes the significant diversity of interests that motivate individuals and the great ambitions for power that drive political actors.\textsuperscript{75} Societies that find a unity of purpose in ideological goals may engage in behaviors that do not well accord with

\textsuperscript{75} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, chap. 11.
their basic security needs. This has been a significant criticism of American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{76} Normatively based communities that motivate the collective pursuit of glory, spiritual redemption, or the spread of ideas have been important actors on the world stage. Stephen Krasner argues that it is only overwhelming power that has given the United States the luxury of pursuing ideological goals without the sacrifice of security.\textsuperscript{77} It would seem plausible that many less powerful states (Iran, Cuba, North Korea to cite some extreme examples) have also pursued ideological or religious goals, to the detriment of their fundamental security interests.

Finally, the possibility of a normative foundation for international relations reflects back on the fundamental Hobbesian problem itself. As the constructivists have suggested, the very notion of the war of all against all may be a social construction rather than a deduction from the irreducible elements of human nature.\textsuperscript{78} A pursuit of the microfoundations of international relations theory will support the constructivist turn to consider at least the range of plausible normative orderings upon which social orders might be built.\textsuperscript{79}

**The Microfoundations of International Relations Theory**

For the study of international relations, the Hobbesian problem is the question of how states find a cohesive basis for their international identity. I have focused here on national security as a particularly appropriate arena in which to examine the Hobbesian problem. National security is the substantive arena in which the traditional logic of international relations theory would lead us most to expect to see strong incentives for cooperation at the domestic level. If we find that the sources of state cohesion are problematic for national security issues, we are even more likely to find them problematic in other arenas, such as international economic relations.

How states solve, or attempt to solve, the Hobbesian problem is important not only to our understanding of the nature of sovereignty, but is also important as a foundation for our theoretical understanding of international behavior. Both the argument that states form around internal security communities,
and the traditional argument of international relations theory that states form around external security communities, are inadequate either to provide a foundation for international relations theory or to describe the empirical reality of cohesive states. While some degree of legitimacy can be built on absolutist power or on the fear of outside invasion, institutions and norms have been a considerably more effective source of legitimacy. Empirically, states have increasingly achieved cohesion through institutions of accountability and through norms that facilitate community and sacrifice.

While structural models that assume away the Hobbesian problem may provide effective explanations for a large number of international behaviors, they are less useful for explaining the basic shape of the international system and the distribution of power within it. At a minimum, legitimacy has long been recognized as a fundament of state power. More interestingly, broad changes in the international distribution of power and the basic internal structure of states can be traced to international competition that has forced states to imitate innovations that have enhanced internal coherence.\textsuperscript{80} Thus, for example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war was not a trivial change in the internal composition of one of the billiard balls of international interactions. Instead, it reveals the ongoing demands of the international system that states maintain internal legitimacy and extractive powers that are commensurate with those of their chief rivals.

As Hobbes emphasized in his writings, maintaining internal coherence is essential for all states. The external behavior of states is affected by this fundamental need for internal coherence. States take actions to enhance their own internal communities, and make attempts to undermine the unity of opposing states. Internally incoherent states affect the international system to the degree that their internal conflicts spill outside their borders and to the degree that their domestic troubles create temptations for other states to interfere in their internal affairs. The models we use to describe behavior in the international system should reflect this domestic-international nexus. Models of international behavior that can incorporate these dynamics will be more useful than traditional single-level models both in the development of international relations theory and in the making of foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{80} Spruyt, \textit{The Sovereign State and Its Competitors}.